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Joseph Blocher 
The Guantanamo Three-Step 
In a recent Response to my Comment,1 Geoffrey Corn, Eric Talbot Jensen, 
and Sean Watts take an interesting stance in defense of the combatant status 
review tribunals (CSRTs).2 Their Response does not dispute—and in fact 
seems to support—my central argument that CSRTs cannot serve as the 
“competent tribunals” required under Article 5 of the Third Geneva 
Convention.3 But Corn, Jensen, and Watts come to bury Article 5, not to praise 
it. They do so by recasting Article 5 as the third step in a three-part detainee-
classification process whose first two steps are controlled entirely by the 
President. These two steps, they argue, render Article 5 tribunals unnecessary 
at Guantanamo. This reading raises thorny problems of executive power and 
undermines the purpose of Article 5. 
i .  one step forward 
My Comment was a response to the Bush Administration’s argument that 
the CSRTs discharged any duty the United States had under Article 5 of the 
Geneva Convention to provide “competent” tribunals to determine detainees’ 
prisoner of war (POW) status. I reasoned that the CSRTs could not fulfill this 
function because they classified detainees according to a categorization—that of 
“enemy combatant”—which is not coextensive with POW (or non-POW) 
status under Article 4. 
 
1.  Joseph Blocher, Comment, Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Flawed Answers to the Wrong 
Question, 116 YALE L.J. 667 (2006). 
2.  Geoffrey Corn, Eric Talbot Jensen & Sean Watts, Understanding the Distinct Function of the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals: A Response to Blocher, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 327 
(2007), http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/04/11/corn_jensen_watts.html. 
3.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
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Corn, Jensen, and Watts do not dispute this argument. Indeed, they agree 
that “the CSRTs did not have authority to make POW classifications”4 and 
that “the CSRTs were appropriately precluded from determining POW 
status.”5 
If only everyone saw it our way. Unfortunately, many argue that a CSRT’s 
finding that a detainee is an enemy combatant is precisely equivalent to an 
Article 5 tribunal’s finding that he is not a POW. In its brief before the Supreme 
Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,6 the government argued that the CSRT process 
“clearly discharges any obligation under Article 5 . . . .”7 Secretary of the Navy 
Gordon England similarly claimed that the CSRTs went “beyond” the 
regulations implementing Article 5,8 and Senator Lindsey Graham put in an 
even higher bid, calling the CSRTs “[A]rticle 5 tribunals on steroids.”9 Legal 
scholars soon joined the chorus,10 claiming, for example, that “CSRTs more 
than fulfill the ‘competent tribunal’ called for under Article 5 of the Geneva 
Convention . . . .”11 And then-Circuit Judge John Roberts, writing for the D.C. 
Circuit in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, suggested that the military commission set up 
to try Salim Ahmed Hamdan—the same commission which the Supreme 
Court, of which Roberts was by that time Chief Justice, struck down a year 
later—was a “competent tribunal” under the army regulation implementing 
Article 5.12 
Even as it struck down the military commissions, however, the Supreme 
Court explicitly reserved decision on whether Hamdan’s status as a POW had 
been properly adjudicated under Article 5.13 The issue of whether CSRTs fulfill 
Article 5’s mandate is thus unfortunately something of a live issue. Corn, 
Jensen, and Watts’s Response makes a positive contribution in this debate to 
the extent that it rejects the categorization of CSRTs as Article 5 tribunals. 
 
4.  Corn et al., supra note 2 at 327. 
5.  Id. 
6.  126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
7.  Brief for the Respondents at 42, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184). 
8.  Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, Defense Department Special Briefing on Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals (Mar. 29, 2005), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ 
2005/tr20050329-2382.html. 
9.  151 CONG. REC. S12,754 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham). 
10.  Paul Rosenzweig, On Liberty and Terror in the Post-9/11 World: A Response to Professor 
Chemerinsky, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 29, 38 (2005). 
11.  Douglas W. Kmiec, Observing the Separation of Powers: The President’s War Power Necessarily 
Remains “The Power To Wage War Successfully,” 53 DRAKE L. REV. 851, 888 (2005). 
12.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J.), rev’d and remanded, 126 
S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
13.  Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795 n.61. 
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Perhaps their Response, and my Comment, will help lay to rest the common 
misconception that CSRTs were the equivalent of Article 5 tribunals. Whether 
or not some other “competent tribunal” could have served the Article 5 
function, the CSRTs did not. And yet it is their findings that have been used to 
justify the detentions at Guantanamo, and that have been compared—by 
scholars, legislators, and the government—to Article 5 tribunals. The purpose 
of my Comment was to show the error of that comparison, a critique which 
Corn, Jensen, and Watts seem to support. 
 
ii.  two steps back 
 
But Corn, Jensen, and Watts don’t try to rehabilitate CSRTs as “competent 
tribunals,” or argue that some other decisionmaker fulfilled Article 5’s 
requirements. They argue instead that the President’s unilateral 
characterizations of the conflict in Afghanistan, and the Taliban and al Qaeda 
forces there, removed any possible “doubt” about the POW status of any 
detainee at Guantanamo and thus rendered Article 5 tribunals unnecessary. 
To reach this result, Corn, Jensen, and Watts argue that the classification of 
prisoners in wartime follows a three-step process. A “central command”14 must 
first determine that the conflict in which the prisoner was captured is covered 
by the Geneva Conventions. It must then “pre-approve[]”15 the opposing 
forces as meeting the definitions laid out in Article 4. Finally, and only if these 
first two tests are met, Article 5 requires that a “competent tribunal” resolve any 
“doubt” about whether a particular detainee belongs to a protected group. 
This characterization of the Geneva Convention rests on a controversial 
understanding of executive power that the authors acknowledge has spawned a 
“debate as to whether the President can rightfully make that determination 
under international law . . . .”16 Suffice it to say, law professors17 and courts18 
have disputed Corn, Jensen, and Watts’s central argument that the President 
can rightfully make sweeping determinations regarding the proper 
 
14.  Corn et al., supra note 2 at 331. 
15.  Id. at 332. 
16.  Id. at 333 n.19. 
17.  See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL 
L. REV. 97, 113-15 (2004) (describing objections to the government’s interpretation of 
Articles 4 and 5). 
18.  In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 480 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated, 
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8757 
(2007) (“Nothing in the Convention itself or in Army Regulation 190-8 authorizes the 
President of the United States to rule by fiat that an entire group of fighters covered by the 
Third Geneva Convention falls outside of the Article 4 definitions of ‘prisoners of war.’”)). 
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classification of a conflict (the first step), or the parties thereto (the second 
step), as he has done with regard to the conflict in Afghanistan and to the 
Taliban and al Qaeda.19 
Perhaps the most heavily criticized of these determinations was the 
President’s declaration that the Taliban did not fall within Article 4(A)(1) 
despite the fact that the Taliban apparently served as the armed forces of 
Afghanistan, a signatory to the Convention, and despite the fact that Article 
4(A)(1) makes no mention of the four conditions—hierarchy, insignia, open 
arms, and adherence to the laws of war—that the Administration claimed the 
Taliban failed to meet.20 Corn, Jensen, and Watts’s argument rests entirely on 
the legitimacy and accuracy of the President’s novel reading of Article 4(A)(1). 
If Article 4(A)(1) does not incorporate these four conditions—they are not 
mentioned until Article(A)(2), and had previously been read as applying only 
there21—then the logic of the President’s collective determinations falls out, 
even assuming he had the authority to make them in the first place. Because 
the Article 4 debate has been well-covered elsewhere, I focus here on the 
narrower question of whether the President’s determinations have removed all 
“doubt” regarding the POW status of all the detainees at Guantanamo and thus 
rendered Article 5 moot. 
The authors acknowledge that the President’s “centralized and unitary 
mass appraisals might initially appear at odds with the individual adjudications 
prescribed by Article 5 . . . .”22 Indeed, Article 5 refers specifically and repeatedly 
to “persons” who “shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until 
such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”23 Thus 
it is Article 5 tribunals, not the executive, who are the proper adjudicators of 
whether a particular group or individual captured in the course of a conflict 
belongs to any of the categories mentioned in Article 4.24 
 
19.  Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to the Vice President, 
et al. (Feb. 7, 2002). 
20.  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and 
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002). 
21.  Corn, Jensen, and Watts recognize that the Bush Administration’s reading of Article 4 came 
as a surprise to “military and international lawyers.” The authors note that the President’s 
determinations “required somewhat controversial adjustments to the course of instruction 
on POW classification at the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s School. Instructors 
regularly encounter resistance to this reading of Article 4(A)(1) from students steeped in 
traditions of literal interpretation of treaty and statutory language.” Corn et al., supra note 2, 
at 330 n.10. 
22.  Id. at 333. 
23.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, surpa note 3. 
24.  See Robert A. Peal, Combatant Status Review Tribunals and the Unique Nature of the War on 
Terror, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1639 (2005). 
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Moreover, Army Regulation 190-8,25 on which the CSRTs themselves were 
patterned, was adopted to implement the Geneva Convention26 and cites the 
Geneva Conventions for the basis of its interpretation.27 Though Corn, Jensen, 
and Watts fail to mention the Regulation, it confirms that Article 5’s focus is on 
individual classifications and that “doubt” cannot be erased by a unilateral, ex 
ante determination by “central command.” The regulation specifies that “[a] 
competent tribunal shall determine the status of any person not appearing to 
be entitled to prisoner of war status who has committed a belligerent act or has 
engaged in hostile activities in aid of enemy armed forces, and who asserts that 
he or she is entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war, or concerning whom any 
doubt of a like nature exists.”28 
But we don’t have to take the detainees’ word for it. According to a 2006 
study of newly released evidence from the CSRTs, even by the government’s 
own count nearly one in five of the detainees “are not affiliated with either al 
Qaeda or the Taliban,”29 the two groups the President has said do not fall 
within Article 4. Are these detainees to be automatically denied POW status 
unless and until “central command” determines that they are members of a 
“pre-approved” fighting force? Even of the detainees who are alleged to be 
somehow connected to al Qaeda or the Taliban, sixty percent are only 
“associated with” those groups, not “members of,” or “fighting for” them.30 
Moreover, ninety-three percent of the detainees were not captured by the 
United States.31 Some were turned in by bounty hunters and reward seekers.32 
These detainees might have simply been in the wrong place at the wrong time, 
or they might be members of the kinds of militias, military groups, and self-
defense forces which are covered by Article 4 and which were, as the authors 
recognize,33 entitled to Article 5 hearings and Article 4 protection in Vietnam. 
These are exactly the kinds of difficult, individual factual questions that 
 
25.  Brief for the Respondents at 42 n.18, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-
184) (“The CSRT was patterned after the ‘competent tribunal’ described in Geneva 
Convention Article 5 and Army Regulation 190-8 . . . but provides more process.”). 
26.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 550 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring). 
27.  Army Reg. 190-8 § 1-1(b) (1997), available at http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/ 
r190_8.pdf. 
28.  Id. 
29.  MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, THE GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: THE GOVERNMENT’S 
STORY 8, available at http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf. 
30.  Id. at 9. 
31.  Id. at 14. 
32.  Jonathan Mahler, The Bush Administration vs. Salim Hamdan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, at 
44. 
33.  Corn et al., supra note 2 at 332 n.16. 
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demand case-by-case adjudication by “competent tribunals.” And considering 
that the United States conducted nearly 1200 such tribunals in the Persian Gulf 
War,34 adjudicating the status of the few hundred detainees at Guantanamo 
would not be prohibitively difficult. 
Corn, Jensen, and Watts raise the possibility that Article 5 tribunals might 
reach “disparate and inconsistent results for captives even from the same 
fighting organizations.”35 This possibility of “inconsistency” is no greater than 
in any other adjudicatory context, nor is it necessarily any more problematic. 
To the contrary, the unique circumstances of the war in Afghanistan—the 
shifting alliances, multiplicity of “fighting organizations,” and different levels 
of individual participation—actually reinforce the importance of individualized, 
fact-based determinations, rather than conflict- and group-wide 
determinations by central command. The “practical concern” with 
“inconsistent results” is less weighty than the problematic consistency that 
Corn, Jensen, and Watts propose: that all detainees, no matter the level of their 
involvement with the Taliban or al Qaeda, are to be denied POW status based 
on the President’s novel and questionable ex ante determinations. 
The danger in Corn, Jensen, and Watts’s “three-step” characterization is 
that it threatens to further concentrate powers of classification in an already 
powerful executive and to eviscerate what the authors call the “third step”—the 
Article 5 tribunals that should actually be the first step of classification. If the 
President had power, under Article 4(A)(1), to invoke collective criteria and 
deny POW status to all opposing forces, the basic purpose of Article 5 would be 
defeated. Neither the Geneva Conventions nor the realities of the conflict in 
Afghanistan compel this result. Far from rendering these tribunals superfluous, 
the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan actually highlights the importance of 
Article 5 and the failure of the CSRTs to fulfill it. 
In the past month, two military judges have ruled that a CSRT’s finding of 
enemy combatant status, even when coupled with the President’s 
determination that members of al Qaeda and the Taliban are unlawful 
combatants, is an insufficient basis for the military commissions to exercise 
jurisdiction.36 And on June 29, in a reversal of its own earlier denial of 
 
34.  See DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 663 
(1992). 
35.  Corn et al., supra note 2 at 332. 
36.  Disposition of Prosecution Motion for Reconsideration at 1, United States v. Khadr (June 
29, 2007), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/ 
Khadr%20ruling%206-29-07.pdf (finding that a CSRT’s finding of “enemy combatant” 
status was insufficient to grant jurisdiction under the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 
which requires a finding of “unlawful enemy combatant” status); Decision and Order —
Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, United States v. Hamdan, (June 4, 2007), 
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certiorari, the Supreme Court voted to hear argument on the rights of 
Guantanamo detainees to challenge their detention in federal courts.37 
Whether or not the Court finds that the military tribunals are an adequate 
substitute for federal habeas, it is increasingly clear that the CSRTs—whose 
enemy combatant determinations have been at the heart of that jurisdictional 
battle—did not, and could not, serve as the Article 5 tribunals the Geneva 
Conventions require. 
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